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PUTTING EQUALITY TO A VOTE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS, AND THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
Billy Corriher*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court recently determined that an Arkansas Supreme Court decision “denied married same-sex couples access to the ‘constellations of benefits . . . linked to marriage,’” quoting its 2015 marriage
equality ruling.1 The High Court overruled the state supreme court and
struck down an Arkansas law treating same-sex couples differently with
respect to their children’s birth certificates.2 As the Court’s per curiam decision recognized, the ruling in Oberfegell v. Hodges said that states may not
“exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions,” including “birth and death certificates.”3 The Arkansas Supreme
Court’s handling of marriage equality and another civil rights issue that was
controversial in Arkansas—school desegregation—exemplifies how elected
judges can limit individual rights in the face of political pressure.4 An appointed Arkansas Supreme Court would be more likely to defend individual
rights from violation by the government than an elected court.
Studies have found evidence that judges respond to political pressure.5
In fact, multiple studies have found that supreme courts elected in expensive, politicized judicial elections exhibit these trends, including rulings

* Senior Researcher, Institute for Southern Studies. J.D., Georgia State University College of
Law; B.A., University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. The author wishes to thank the William
H. Bowen School of Law at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock for its support and for
encouraging discussion of these issues.
1. Pavan. v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2601 (2015)).
2. Id. at 2078–79.
3. Id. at 2078 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38
J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 169–71 (2009) (a study by Prof. Joanna Shepherd of a data set of state
supreme court decisions from 1995 to 1998 found evidence to support “the widespread belief
that judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be reelected or reappointed.” She
concluded that voters’ political leanings were strongly associated with judges’ voting records,
but “the voting of judges who do not face pressure from retention politics—judges with permanent tenure and judges in their last term before mandatory retirement—does not reflect the
political preferences of the same groups” of voters).
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against LGBT rights, criminal defendants, and plaintiffs in tort cases.6 At the
federal level, framers like Alexander Hamilton argued for an independent
judiciary to counter political pressure.7 Some of the studies on elected judges confirm Hamilton’s view on judicial selection by showing that judges
who are not facing reelection or reappointment do not exhibit the same
tendencies as those who want another term on the bench.8 Federal judges are
on the bench for life or until their retirement because judges who never have
to be reappointed or reelected can make decisions based solely on the law
and the facts.9
Federal judges, who are insulated from political pressure, led the way
in the fights for marriage equality and racially-integrated schools in Arkansas, even if their rulings were not popular in the state.10 The elected Arkansas Supreme Court, in contrast, has generally stayed in lockstep with public
opinion and the political branches on high profile civil rights issues, avoiding rulings that would have been controversial among voters.11 The state
supreme court acceded to the state’s attempts to limit or delay the implementation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in Brown v. Board of Education12 and Obergefell v. Hodges.13

6. See, e.g., Eric Lesh, Justice Out of Balance: How the Election of Judges and the
Stunning Lack of Diversity on State Courts Threaten LGBT Rights, LAMBDA LEGAL (2016),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/justiceoutofbalance_final_rev1_2.pdf; Joanna
Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, Television Advertising and
State Supreme Court Justices’ Decisions in Criminal Cases, SKEWED JUSTICE (2014),
http://skewedjustice.org/; Billy Corriher, No Justice for the Injured: Big Business Is Funneling Campaign Cash to Judges who Allow Corporate Wrongdoers to Escape Accountability,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2013), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
05/NoJusticeforInjured.pdf.
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
8. Some studies have found changes in judges’ voting behavior as their reelection
nears. See Michael Kang and Joanna Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 75
(2011) (a study by Professors Joanna Shepherd and Michael Kang found correlations between contributions from business groups and rulings in favor of businesses, but “when
elected judges are serving their last term before mandatory retirement, their favoring of business litigants essentially disappears.”); See also Melissa Hall, Constituent Influence in State
Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. OF POLITICS, 1117, 1117–24
(1986) (concluding that judges facing reelection pressure are less likely to dissent in high
profile cases if their views are inconsistent with their voters’ views).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
10. See infra Part II.
11. Univ. of Ark., The Arkansas Poll (2017), https://fulbright.uark.edu/departments/
political-science/partners/arkansas-poll.php; Julie Ray, Reflections on the “Trouble in Little
Rock,” Part II¸ GALLUP NEWS (Mar. 4, 2003), http://news.gallup.com/poll/7900/reflectionstrouble-little-rock-part.aspx.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
13. 135 S. Ct. 2584. See infra Part II.
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As Arkansas struggled against the desegregation of its schools, Justice
Jim Johnson fought to preserve white supremacy,14 and his colleagues on the
state supreme court acquiesced to the political branches’ efforts to delay
complying with Brown.15 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court intervened in
Cooper v. Aaron to end Arkansas’ obstinacy,16 with the backing of President
Dwight Eisenhower’s National Guard troops.17
More recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s record on LGBT rights
has been disappointing, to say the least. An Arkansas justice admitted that
his court delayed ruling in a 2014 same-sex marriage case because of the
political implications,18 and the court in 2016 ruled that a mother had no
right to be listed on her child’s birth certificate, along with her wife.19 The
Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the state could continue treating samesex couples differently,20 but the U.S. Supreme Court recently overturned
this decision.21 As in Cooper half-a-century earlier, the High Court instructed state officials to implement its groundbreaking civil rights ruling.22
In contrast, federal courts have enforced individual constitutional
rights, even when a political majority in the state objects.23 The legal battles
over civil rights in Arkansas shed light on the political pressure that can
influence elected judges. Hamilton said that without an independent judiciary that can check political majorities, all of the Constitution’s “particular
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”24 When judges must be
reelected to keep their jobs, constitutional values like justice and equality
are left solely in the hands of a political majority. Elected judges, therefore,
cannot serve the counter-majoritarian role that the system of separation of
powers sometimes requires.25
14. Gene Lyons, Racist “Justice” Is Dead, but not Gone, SALON (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.salon.com/2010/02/18/justice_4/.
15. Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 446–48, 323 S.W.2d 877, 877–78 (1959).
16. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
17. Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 24, 1957).
18. Ex-Justice: Arkansas Supreme Court Voted to Strike Gay Marriage Ban, Withheld
Ruling, ARKANSAS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.arkansasnews.com/news/arkansas/exjustice-state-supreme-court-voted-strike-ban-gay-marriage-held-ruling.
19. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, at *18, 505 S.W.3d 169, 181 (2016), judgment
rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (the court upheld an Arkansas law that requires a husband to be
automatically listed as a parent on a birth certificate, though there is no such presumption for
wives of women who give birth).
20. Id.
21. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. 2075.
22. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Pavan, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (No. 16-992), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/16-992-cert-petition.pdf.
23. See supra note 11.
24. Hamilton, supra note 7.
25. Joanna Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 Mich. L. REV.
929, 939 (2016).
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Part II of this essay discusses two examples of the Arkansas Supreme
Court failing to protect constitutional rights in the face of political pressure,
contrasting the state judiciary’s role with that of the federal courts in enforcing constitutional rights to marriage equality and to integrated public
schools.26 Part III then acknowledges that, in recent years, the Arkansas Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the right to jury trial in civil cases and
other related provisions of the state constitution.27 However, healthcare providers and other special interests critical of these rulings are funding the
campaigns of supreme court candidates that they prefer.28 Part III also discusses how these special interests are using “soft on crime” attack ads to
elect their preferred judges, and how the rights of criminal defendants may
be caught in the crossfire.29 The essay concludes in Part IV by arguing that
Arkansas’s highest court should be chosen in a way that maximizes its independence from political pressure.30 This would help to ensure that judges are
not chosen based on their political acumen or ability to attract campaign
contributors. The Arkansas Bar has proposed a system in which justices are
appointed by an independent commission, based on qualifications, for a single term.31 Arkansas should adopt this amendment. It would give justices the
independence needed to protect individual rights and check the power of the
political branches.
II. BOWING UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE
A.

The Judiciary’s Role in Desegregating Little Rock’s Schools

History views Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus in a harsh light, due to
his attempts to stop school desegregation in the late 1950s.32 Behind the
scenes, Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Jim Johnson played a crucial role
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 370 Ark. 139,
257 S.W.3d 879 (2007) (assessing the legislature’s compliance with rulings that it was not
providing a constitutionally adequate education to some school districts); Bayer CropScience
LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822 (2011) (striking down a limit on punitive
damages awards).
28. Billy Corriher, Koch Brothers and D.C. Conservatives Spending Big on Nonpartisan
State Supreme Court Races, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (August 2014), https://cdn.american
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Stat eSupremeCourtsv2.pdf.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See TASK FORCE ON MAINTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON MAINTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY
13 (2016).
32. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Little Rock Nine, HIST.,
http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/central-high-school-integration (last visited Feb.
15, 2017).

2017]

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

595

in pushing the governor towards his infamous, hardline stance.33 Before he
joined the court in 1958, Justice Johnson drafted a state constitutional
amendment that rejected the Brown decision and sought to preserve a racist
education system.34 Justice Johnson also won a seat in the state legislature in
1950, and soon after, he brought the White Citizens’ Council to Arkansas.35
The future justice actually challenged the governor in 1956, criticizing Faubus for not opposing integration strongly enough.36 Governor Faubus kept
his seat, but Justice Johnson’s popularity as a gubernatorial candidate may
have played a key role in pushing the governor to oppose racial integration.
Justice Johnson even claimed that he fed the governor false information
about a mob planning to converge on Little Rock’s Central High School as it
was desegregating.37 Governor Faubus used the perceived threat of violence—by mobs or students—to justify closing schools in the 1958-59
school year, under authority he had just been granted by the state legislature.38
Justice Johnson was elected to the supreme court in 1958.39 During his
tenure, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach to desegregation was similar to that of the governor, and it may have reflected the prevailing sentiment among white voters.40 In Garrett v. Faubus, the court upheld the law
allowing the governor to close schools.41 The majority’s opinion commented
on Brown: “We deeply deplore the fact that the Supreme Court of the United
States did not follow the clear legal precedents announced in Plessy v. Ferguson.”42 The court said that Plessy “must have been reassuring to the people for nearly fifty years.”43 The justices acknowledged that it must respect
the Brown decision, but it upheld a law that it acknowledged was “intended
to slow the implementation of integration . . . until a lawful way could be
devised to escape it entirely.”44

33. Lyons, supra note 14.
34. KEN GORMLEY, THE DEATH OF AMERICAN VIRTUE: CLINTON V. STARR 100–01
(2010).
35. John Kirk, The Election that Changed Arkansas Politics, ARK. TIMES (March 28,
2012), https://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/the-election-that-changed-arkansas-politics/Conte
nt?oid=2140398.
36. Id.; JOE CONASON & GENE LYONS, THE HUNTING OF THE PRESIDENT: THE TEN-YEAR
CAMPAIGN TO DESTROY BILL AND HILLARY CLINTON 68–69 (2000).
37. Lyons, supra note 14.
38. Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 446–48, 323 S.W.2d 877, 877–78 (1959).
39. Editorial, What’s at Stake When Judges Become Politicians, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE, Apr. 26, 2006.
40. Garrett, 230 Ark. at 454, 323 S.W.2d at 881; Ray, supra note 11.
41. Garrett, 230 Ark. at 450, 323 S.W.2d at 879.
42. Id. at 450, 323 S.W.2d at 879.
43. Id. at 454, 323 S.W.2d at 881.
44. Id. at 453, 323 S.W.2d at 881.
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The court in several passages mentions voters’ opposition to integration. A year after Justice Johnson’s election, the court said, “we take judicial
notice of numerous elections where the people have expressed their feelings
in no uncertain terms.”45 Integration was described by the Garrett court as
“a social problem fraught with frightening consequences in the minds of
many people.”46 The court said that the course of desegregation “can be better charted by those closest to the people affected and therefore better acquainted with local conditions.”47 The justices said that Arkansans would
prefer this to “being forced into acceptance . . . by a few people who are far
removed from the scene and who, they feel, are not sympathetic or understanding.”48 One concurring justice warned that integration would lead to
“extracurricular activities involving social contacts,” including sports and
school dances.49
Justice Johnson joined in a colleague’s dissent that also criticized
Brown but found that the school-closings law violated the state constitution.50 The dissent seemed to take pride in Arkansas’s defiance of Brown:
“There began in the Southern States—of which Arkansas is proud to be a
part—a determining and never-to-be-ended campaign to prevent racial integration in the public schools.”51
The federal courts, however, strived to implement Brown and rejected
the state’s attempt to delay desegregation.52 In the fall of 1957, two days
after a state judge issued a temporary restraining order to stop the integration of Central High, a federal judge overruled this decision and enjoined the
plaintiff seeking the order.53 The Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the federal judge’s ruling.54
In its landmark Cooper v. Aaron decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Arkansas’s effort to thwart desegregation and harshly criticized the
state’s elected officials for attempting to avoid implementing Brown.55 “The
constitutional rights of children . . . can neither be nullified openly and directly . . . nor nullified indirectly . . . through evasive schemes for segregation.”56 The Court acknowledged that violence had erupted, but it blamed
the state’s elected officials for inflaming racial tensions. “The constitutional
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 459, 323 S.W.2d at 884.
Id. at 458, 323 S.W.2d at 884.
Garrett, 230 Ark. at 456, 323 S.W.2d at 882.
Id. at 458, 323 S.W.2d at 884.
Id. at 470–71, 323 S.W.2d at 890–91 (Robinson, J., concurring).
Id. at 482–83, 323 S.W.2d at 896–97 (McFaddin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 482, 323 S.W.2d at 897.
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808, 809–10 (8th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 811.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 17.
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rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and
disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature.”57 The school board in Little Rock told the Court that all three branches
of Arkansas’s government opposed desegregation.58 The Court responded:
“No state . . . judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”59 It is a bedrock of our federalist system
that state government officials cannot defy federal court orders.60
A comparison of the Cooper and Garrett decisions highlights the differences in how the state and federal courts dealt with desegregation in Arkansas. The state’s judiciary sanctioned the political branches’ attempt to
delay integration and perhaps “escape it entirely.”61 Justice Johnson even
claimed that he played a pivotal role in pushing the governor to defy the
federal courts.62 But federal judges, who are largely insulated from political
pressure, ordered Southern states to allow black and white children to attend
school together.63
After he left the state supreme court, Justice Johnson went on to manage the Arkansas campaign of segregationist presidential candidate George
Wallace.64 When “Justice Jim” Johnson ran against Republican Governor
Winthrop Rockefeller in 1966, he publicized rumors that Rockefeller was
gay.65
B.

State Supreme Court Abdicates Its Role in Marriage Equality

In 2014, an Arkansas state judge struck down the state constitution’s
ban on same-sex marriage as violating the U.S. Constitution.66 Pulaski
County Circuit Court Judge Chris Piazza compared the marriage amendment
to the ban on interracial marriage struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in
the 1967 Loving v. Virginia case67:
It has been over forty years since Mildred Loving was given the right to
marry the person of her choice. The hatred and fears have long since
57. Id. at 16.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 18.
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
61. Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 453, 323 S.W.2d 877, 881 (1959).
62. Lyons, supra note 14.
63. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1990).
64. Garrick Feldman, Justice Jim Fought Tough Final Battle, LEADER (Feb. 17, 2010),
https://www.arkansasleader.com/articles/top-story-justice-jim-fought-tough-final-battle/.
65. BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 114 (2004).
66. Order Granting Summary Judgement in favor of the Plaintiffs and Finding Act 144
of 1997 and Amendment 83 Unconstitutional at 8, Wright v. State, 2014 WL 1908815 (No.
60CV-13-2662).
67. Id.
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vanished and she and her husband lived full lives together; so it will be
for the same-sex couples. It is time to let that beacon of freedom shine
brighter on all our brothers and sisters. We will be stronger for it.68

Within three days of the decision, 169 same-sex couples applied for
marriage licenses in Pulaski County, which includes Little Rock.69 Local
media reported that the first couple married was Shelly Butler, 51, and Susan Barr, 48, who had been together for “nearly 30 years after first meeting
at Southern Arkansas University.”70 “Today means the world,” Butler said.
“It’s a long time coming.”71
Social conservatives, including former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee,
called for Judge Piazza’s impeachment,72 and several legislators actually
discussed the possibility.73 One state representative criticized Judge Piazza
for contradicting the will of voters, who approved the state constitution’s
ban on same-sex marriage in 2004.74 “This is a clear example where the will
of the people has been trampled by one judge,” he said, “[i]t is very disappointing . . . when someone like an activist judge thinks their will is greater
than the majority of our state.”75
The Supreme Court of Arkansas quickly put the order on hold as it
considered the appeal.76 When two new justices joined the court in January
2015,77 the court somehow ruled that the additions to the bench required the
plaintiffs to bring a new appeal.78 In a public letter, Chief Justice Jim Hannah claimed the legal issue was “created out of whole cloth” to delay the
68. Id. at 9.
69. Gavin Lesnick, Same-sex Couples Marry in Pulaski County; McDaniel Seeks Stay,
ARK.ONLINE (May 12, 2014), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2014/may/12/crowdgathers-pulaski-county-issues-first-same-sex/.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Mario Trujillo, Huckabee Wants Judge Impeached After Gay Marriage Ruling, HILL
(May 12, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/205887-huckabee-wants-judgeimpeached-after-gay-marriage-ruling.
73. The City Wire Staff, Calls for Judge Piazza Impeachment Follow Gay Marriage
Ruling, TALK BUS. & POL. (May 10, 2014), http://talkbusiness.net/2014/05/calls-for-judgepiazza-impeachment-follow-gay-marriage-ruling/#.U3KUrfldXh4.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Paresh Dave, Arkansas Supreme Court Ruling Leaves Uncertainty on Gay Marriage,
L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-arkansasstay-gay-marriage-licenses-20140514-story.html.
77. Max Brantley, The New Arkansas Supreme Court, with Female Majority, Takes the
Bench; One Drops Potential Hint on Marriage Case, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (January 6,
2015, 2:03 PM), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/01/06/the-newarkansas-supreme-court-takes-the-bench-one-drops-potential-hint-on-marriage-case.
78. Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 189, at *7, 461 S.W.3d 687, 692 (2015).
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court’s decision.79 Justices Hannah and Paul Danielson recused themselves.80 Justice Danielson said that he could not ethically be “complicit in
machinations which have the effect of depriving justice to any party before
this court.”81 When Justice Donald Corbin retired from the bench in 2015, he
admitted that the court had voted 6-1 in 2014 to affirm Judge Piazza’s decision and strike down the same-sex marriage ban.82 He said the legal issues
were clear, particularly the argument that the ban violated the U.S. Constitution.83 “It was a tough political issue, but legally it was a cakewalk. Anybody who knows anything about the law or had any training whatsoever as a
constitutional lawyer would know that,” he said.84 Justice Corbin confirmed
that the justices were contacted by legislators and social conservative groups
who pressured them to overturn Judge Piazza’s decision.85 The state Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission investigated the delay but did not
conclude that ethics rules were violated.86
Hundreds of Arkansas couples had to wait to vindicate their constitutional right to marry87 because the Arkansas Supreme Court was worried
about the politics surrounding marriage equality. The state supreme court
dismissed the case as moot after the U.S. Supreme Court brought marriage
equality to the entire nation in 2015.88
Since then, the Arkansas Supreme Court has stopped hesitating in cases
involving LGBT rights; the court has instead ruled against the rights of
same-sex couples in two decisions.89 In December 2016, the court ruled that
the state could continue treating same-sex couples differently, when it
comes to the birth certificates of their children.90

79. Id. at *8, 461 S.W.3d at 693.
80. Id., 461 S.W.3d at 693.
81. Andrew Demillo, Danielson not Seeking Reelection on Arkansas Supreme Court,
WASH. TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/26/
danielson-not-seeking-re-election-on-arkansas-supr/.
82. Interview by Ernest Dumas with Justice Donald L. Corbin, Arkansas Supreme
Court, in Hot Springs, Arkansas (July 27, 2015).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Max Brantley, Judicial Discipline Panel Clears Supreme Court of Misconduct Complaint in Marriage Case, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2015 4:15 PM),
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/09/16/judicial-discipline-panelclears-supreme-court-of-misconduct-complaint-in-marriage-case.
87. Id.
88. Smith v. Wright, 2015 Ark. 298 (2015).
89. Smith v. Pavan, 2016 Ark. 437, 505 S.W.3d 169 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 2075
(2017); Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2017 Ark. 49, 510 S.W.3d 258 (2017).
90. Smith, 2016 Ark. at *19, 505 S.W.3d at 182.
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Marisa and Terrah Pavan were married in New Hampshire in 2011, and
they had a child in Arkansas in May 2015, just months before Obergefell.91
The Arkansas Department of Health refused to put Marisa’s name on the
child’s birth certificate, along with Terrah, who gave birth.92 If Marisa had
been a man, state law would have required that he be listed on the birth certificate.93
The Pavans and two other lesbian couples sued the state.94 Judge Timothy Fox ruled in their favor and ordered the state to treat same-sex couples
the same as opposite-sex couples with respect to birth certificates.95 The
Arkansas Supreme Court overruled that decision and rejected the argument
that Obergefell required the state to stop limiting its presumption of parentage to men who are married to women who give birth.96 In an opinion by
Justice Josephine Hart, the court also found that the disparate treatment of
lesbian couples was justified by the state’s need for accurate records of biological parents for public health purposes, even though husbands are automatically listed on birth certificates regardless of biological parentage. 97
Two of the justices also admonished Judge Fox for suggesting, in their
words, “that if this court granted the stay, then it would deprive persons of
their constitutional rights, and that this court previously had deprived people
of their constitutional rights in a separate matter.”98
In Obergefell, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry “on the same terms as accorded
to couples of the opposite sex.”99 The Court ruled that bans on same-sex
marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause.100 Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion emphasized the harm to
same-sex couples and their children when states treat them differently:
This harm results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples
are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem
intolerable in their own lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the
more precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that
status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them
91. Id. at *2, 505 S.W.3d at 172.
92. Id.
93. State law says that husbands are automatically listed as the parents on a birth certificate. Id. at *11, 505 S.W.3d at 177–78.
94. Id. at *3, 505 S.W.3d at 173.
95. Id. at *3–4, 505 S.W.3d at 173.
96. Smith, 2016 Ark. at *19, 505 S.W.3d at 182.
97. Id. at *18, 505 S.W.3d at 181.
98. Id. at *20, 505 S.W.3d at 182.
99. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
100. Id. at 2604 –05.
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out of a central institution of the Nation’s society. Same-sex couples,
too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of
the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.101

Justice Kennedy’s language clearly appears broad enough to cover issues like birth certificates. The Court even included a list of the benefits
associated with marriage, a list that included birth certificates.102 The Arkansas Supreme Court disregards this language by noting that Obergefell mentions birth certificates “only once.”103 The plaintiff, Jim Obergefell, was
seeking to have his name listed on his husband’s death certificate, and a
plaintiff couple from Tennessee was seeking to have their parental rights
reflect their marriage.104 As in the school desegregation cases, the Arkansas
Supreme Court twisted the language of the U.S. Supreme Court to limit the
reach of a historic civil rights ruling.105
Justice Danielson’s dissent emphasized Kennedy’s concern about stigmatizing the children of same-sex couples and the stability of such families.106 He argued that birth certificates were clearly included in Obergefell’s
language about the benefits associated with marriage.107 Chief Justice Howard Brill’s dissent included the comment, “Regardless of personal values
and regardless of a belief that the United States Supreme Court may have
wrongfully decided a legal issue, all are bound by the law of the land.”108
Justice Rhonda Wood agreed that states cannot constitutionally deny samesex couples the benefits to marital status, which include equal access to birth
certificates.109
Justice Wood did, however, argue that the court should vacate Judge
Fox’s order and give the state more time to comply, due to “the fluid nature
of everyone’s reaction to the same-sex marriage decision and the State’s
understandably evolving response to it.”110 Justice Wood implored the state
legislature to amend state law to comply with Obergefell.111 Her dissent said
that “states must comprehensively review their laws so that married same101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 2601–02.
Id. at 2601.
Smith, 2016 Ark. at *10, 505 S.W.3d at 176.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–95 (2015).
Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 446, 323 S.W.2d 877, 877 (1959).
Smith, 2016 Ark. at *35, 505 S.W.3d at 190 (Danielson, J., dissenting)
Id.
Id. at *27, 505 S.W.3d at 185–86 (Brill, J., dissenting).
Id. at *32 –33, 505 S.W.3d at 188–89 (Wood, J., dissenting).
Id. at *28, 505 S.W.3d at 186.
Id. at *32, 505 S.W.3d at 188–89.
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sex couples and opposite-sex couples receive the same benefits of marriage,
in light of . . . Obergefell v. Hodges.”112 Justice Kennedy’s opinion, however, made clear that “individuals need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.”113 He said this is true, “even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.”114
In February 2017, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down a Fayetteville civil rights law that prohibited discrimination against LGBT people in
housing, employment, or public accommodations.115 The court cited a state
law barring local civil rights ordinances,116 one of only three in the U.S.,
including North Carolina’s notorious H.B. 2.117
Just a few years ago, in 2011, the court unanimously struck down a
state ban on adoption by same-sex couples.118 The court said that the ban
violated a state constitutional right to privacy: “the entire privilege afforded
by law to have children in the home, whether adopted or foster children, is
denied to cohabiting sexual partners. In both situations, the penalty imposed
is a considerable burden on the right to intimacy in the home free from invasive government scrutiny.”119
Why has the court taken a turn against LGBT rights? In the same time
frame, elections for the Arkansas Supreme Court have become more contested and much more expensive.120 The court now includes more justices
who were supported by conservative groups like the Law Enforcement Alliance of America, a nonprofit linked to the National Rifle Association that
does not disclose its donors.121 The 2014 election saw the first attack ads in
112. Smith, 2016 Ark. at *28, 505 S.W.3d at 186 (Wood, J., dissenting).
113. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
114. Id.
115. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville, 2017 Ark. 49, at *9–10, 510 S.W.3d 258,
263.
116. Id. at *9, 510 S.W.3d at 263.
117. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Nonsense About Bathrooms: How Purported Concerns
over Safety Block LGBT Nondiscrimination Laws and Obscure Real Religious Liberty Concerns, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1373, 1380 (2017).
118. Ark. Dep’t of Human Services. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at *27, 380 S.W.3d 429, 443
(2011).
119. Id. at *14–15, 380 S.W.3d at 437.
120. In 2014, more than $500,000 was spent during an election for three seats on the
Arkansas Supreme Court, and it was “the first time outside groups funded TV spending in
recent history.” SCOTT GREYTAK ET AL., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013-14 66 (Laurie Kinney ed., 2015). The 2016 Arkansas Supreme
Court election saw nearly five times as much spending—$2.4 million—and a large portion of
that was spending a Washington, D.C.-based group that does not disclose its donors. ALICIA
BANNON ET AL., BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 201516 13, 42 (2017).
121. Id.; Benjamin Hardy, Dark Money, National Review and the Arkansas Supreme
Court Race, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG, (Feb. 17, 2016, 11:38 AM), https://www.arktimes.com/
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an Arkansas Supreme Court race,122 and as Justice Corbin’s comments made
clear, the justices are well aware of the political risks involved in ruling for
LGBT rights in this political climate.123
A report from Lambda Legal examined 127 state supreme court rulings
in LGBT rights cases from 2003 to 2015.124 The report found that elected
state supreme courts were less likely to protect LGBT rights.125 Lambda
Legal said its results suggest that this “can be attributed to ideological factors playing a larger role in shaping judges’ decisions in these courts.” 126
Lambda Legal concluded:
Each day, thousands of elected judges in state courts across the country
make decisions that could cost them their jobs if the law requires a ruling
that is unpopular enough to anger a majority of voters or inspire special
interest attacks. This threat is particularly acute when countermajoritarian constitutional rights are at stake, including those of LGBT
people. If judges can’t safeguard the rights of vulnerable minorities
without fear of retaliation, that dynamic renders our constitutional right
to due process extremely vulnerable.127

Arkansas’s high court is not alone. Other supreme court justices in conservative states have either defied or tested the limits of marriage equality
rulings. Justices in Louisiana and Mississippi dissented when their colleagues voted to apply Obergefell to their state’s marriage laws.128 Chief
Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court was removed from office—for a second time—for defying federal court orders.129 This time
around, Chief Justice Moore was removed for ordering Alabama judges to
defy a federal court ruling that struck down the state’s ban on same-sex marriage.130 Chief Justice Moore was elected on an anti-LGBT platform in

ArkansasBlog/archives/2016/02/17/dark-money-national-review-and-the-arkansas-supremecourt-race.
122. GREYTAK, supra note 120.
123. Interview, supra note 82.
124. See Lesh, supra note 6.
125. Id. at 21.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 15.
128. Billy Corriher, A Handful of Elected State Judges Continue to Deny Marriage
Equality, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/courts/reports/2015/12/01/126270/a-handful-of-elected-state-judges-continue-to-denymarriage-equality/.
129. Moore v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, No. 1160002, 2017 WL 1403696, at
*17 (Ala. Apr. 19, 2017).
130. Id. at *12.
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2012.131 In Iowa, the elected supreme court unanimously struck down the
state’s same-sex marriage ban in 2009,132 and three justices paid a political
price—being thrown off the court in the 2010 election.133
In Arkansas and some other states with elected judges, it is up to federal judges to fully realize the promise of marriage equality. Some jurisdictions are still treating married LGBT couples differently two years after
Obergefell.
III. POLITICIZED AND EXPENSIVE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
A.

Arkansas Supreme Court Protects Right to Jury Trial

Teresa Broussard sued her healthcare providers for severe complications following surgery to have her thyroid glands removed in 2006.134 She
experienced swelling, pain, and what she thought was a burn on her neck
and chest: “Broussard described the tissue at the incision as tough and leathery, and she said that black and purplish lines soon appeared that increased
over time.”135 Broussard was released from the hospital but returned a week
later, after the burn spread and the resulting pain grew more intense.136 She
said that “dead and sloughing tissue developed at her neck and chest,” and
she had to have skin removed and replaced with grafts.137
Broussard’s lawsuit was dismissed under an Arkansas “tort reform”
law that required patients who file medical malpractice lawsuits to provide
expert testimony from “a medical care provider of the same specialty as the
defendant.”138 The Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the law in 2012,
holding that the statute was “procedural law” and not “substantive law” that
defines legal rights or obligations.139 The court said that “procedural law
prescribes ‘the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced,’”140 and
131. Tim Murphy, 8 Candidates We Can’t Believe Are Actually Going to Win, MOTHER
JONES (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/11/kerry-bentivoliomichael-grimm-candidates-actually-winning/.
132. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009).
133. A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?partner=rss&emc=r
ss.
134. Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at *3, 386 S.W.3d
385, 387 (2012).
135. Id. at *2, 386 S.W.3d at 387.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *7, 386 S.W.3d at 389.
139. Id., 386 S.W.3d at 389–90.
140. Broussard, 2012 Ark. at *5, 386 S.W.3d at 389 (citing Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., Ark. 241 at *8, 308 S.W.3d 135, 141 (2009) (quoting Summerville v. Thrower,
369 Ark. 231, 237, 253 S.W.3d 415, 419–20 (2007))).
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such rules “lie solely within the province of this court.”141 The court also
noted that the law established the qualifications that an expert witness must
possess, which is a decision for trial courts.142 The amendment violated the
state constitution’s separation-of-powers provisions, as well as “the inherent
authority of the courts to protect . . . the rights of the litigants.” 143
The court struck down another “tort reform” provision in a 2011 lawsuit by 12 farmers who sued the manufacturer of an experimental strain of
genetically modified rice.144 After the rice invaded other crops, several countries banned American rice, and the European Union imposed strict testing
requirements.145 Rice exports dropped dramatically, and the farmers sued for
lost revenue and punitive damages.146 The defendant corporation made more
than $1 billion in profits that year, and the trial court imposed $42 million in
punitive damages.147 A state law, however, limited punitive damages to
around $1 million, unless the defendant intentionally harmed the plaintiff.148
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages limit violated
a provision of the state constitution that says, “no law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries
to persons or property” except for workers compensation laws.149
The right to a jury trial is a foundational principle of American democracy.150 The U.S. Constitution and most state constitutions include a right to
a jury trial in civil cases in which the damages exceed a certain threshold. 151
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution says the right to a jury
trial “shall be preserved” in cases involving damages greater than twenty
dollars.152 The constitutions of Arkansas and most other states use stronger
language in stating that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”153
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution recognized the importance of this
right. The Revolutionary-era colonists, facing prosecutions for violating
British laws in which they had no say, turned to jury nullification as a means
141. Id. at *5, 386 S.W.3d at 389.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *7, 386 S.W.3d at 390.
144. Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at *2, 385 S.W.3d 822, 825
(2011).
145. Id. at *3, 385 S.W.3d at 826.
146. Id. at *4, 385 S.W.3d at 826–27.
147. Id. at *8, 385 S.W.3d at 828.
148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (Repl. 2005).
149. Bayer CropScience LP, 2011 Ark. at *10, 385 S.W.3d at 830; ARK. CONST. art. V, §
32.
150. See Taylor Asen, The Jury Trial Implosion: The Decline of Trial by Jury and Its
Significance for Appellate Courts, POUND CIV. JUST. INST. (2011) (some state constitutions
even describe the right to a jury trial in civil cases as “sacred”).
151. Id.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
153. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; Asen, supra note 150, at 4.
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of protest.154 John Adams said that representative government and trial by
jury are the heart and lungs of liberty and that without them we have “no
other fortification against being ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep,
worked like cattle and fed and clothed like swine and hounds.”155
More recently, the protections afforded by the Seventh Amendment
have been limited by rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court, which has ruled
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law.156 The Court has also
broadly interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to reject many state-law defenses by consumers or patients who object to having their cases sent to
arbitration, where consumer advocates argue the deck is stacked in favor of
corporate defendants.157 State constitutional rights to jury trial have also
been limited by state supreme courts whose members were elected with
campaign support or contributions from big business.158
Since these rulings against tort reform, the nursing home industry has
spent millions of dollars to shape Arkansas’s appellate courts.159 Nursing
home CEO Michael Morton helped bankroll the 2014 campaign of Judge
Mike Maggio for a seat on the Arkansas Court of Appeals, until the candidate withdrew following a series of scandals.160 Judge Maggio was later
convicted of bribery for accepting tens of thousands of dollars in campaign
cash from Morton in exchange for reducing a verdict in favor of a family
who sued after a relative died at one of Morton’s nursing homes.161

154. Michael Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 IND. L.J. 1281, 1284 (1993); Renee Lettow
Lerner & Suja Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitution
center.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-vii (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
155. JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 482 (2015).
156. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
157. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (ruling that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts a California rule that an arbitration clause is unconscionable and
unenforceable if it is an adhesion contract, the disputes would likely to involve small amounts
of money, and the party with inferior bargaining power alleges fraud); Kindred Nursing Centers, L. P. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts
a Kentucky Supreme Court rule that an arbitration agreement violates the state constitutional
right to a jury trial if it is signed by a power of attorney whose authority does not specifically
include the power to consent to arbitration).
158. See Corriher, supra note 6, at 12–28.
159. Max Brantley, Nursing Home Bribery Case Details Suspect Judicial Fund-Raising,
ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG (June 29, 2016, 12:38 PM), https://www.arktimes.com/
ArkansasBlog/archives/2016/06/29/nursing-home-bribery-case-filing-details-judicial-fundraising; Max Brantley, Nursing Home Industry Pours Big Money into Arkansas Appellate
Court Races, ARK. TIMES; ARK. BLOG (March 12, 2014, 7:17 AM), https://
www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2014/03/12/nursing-home-industry-pours-bigmoney-into-arkansas-appellate-court-races.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Justice Rhonda Wood received campaign contributions from Morton
and other healthcare interests in her 2014 campaign,162 but she refused to
recuse herself under the court’s ethics rules in a lawsuit against Morton.163
Justice Wood acknowledged that Morton donated $40,000 to her campaign—more than one-quarter of the total received—but the campaign returned half of this money.164 In three elections for the court of appeals and
state supreme court, Justice Wood has raised around $280,000, including
more than $90,000 from the healthcare industry, according to the National
Institute on Money in State Politics.165 Much of this campaign cash ultimately came from companies owned by Morton.166
Morton also contributed to an effort to amend the Arkansas Constitution to limit liability for nursing homes and other healthcare providers for
medical malpractice,167 though the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the
referendum.168 The court found the referendum’s description of the amendment was inadequate because it did not define “noneconomic damages” and
did not allow it to be put before voters.169 Justice Wood argued that the court
did not provide enough guidance on how to draft an amendment that would
pass muster.170
The Arkansas legislature passed a proposed constitutional amendment
that would limit punitive and noneconomic damages in civil cases.171 The
amendment would also take away the Arkansas Supreme Court’s authority
over court rules and give it to the legislature, raising questions about the
separation of powers.172 This provision of the amendment would negate the
ruling, discussed above, to strike down a tort reform law as infringing the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority. The state bar proposed a
competing amendment to maintain the court’s rulemaking authority, require

162. Robinson Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Phillips, 2016 Ark. 388, at *1, 502 S.W.3d 519,
521.
163. Id. at *7, 502 S.W.3d at 523.
164. Id. at *2–3, 502 S.W.3d at 521.
165. National Institute on Money in State Politics, Wood, Rhonda,
FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG https://www.followthemoney.org/entity-details?eid=6566943&de
fault=candidate (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
166. Id.
167. Benjamin Hardy, How to Buy a Constitutional Amendment in Arkansas, ARK. TIMES
(August 11, 2016), https://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/how-to-buy-a-constitutional-amendm
ent-in-arkansas/Content?oid=4530474.
168. Wilson v. Martin, 2016 Ark. 334, at *2, 500 S.W.3d 160, 162.
169. Id. at *10, 500 S.W.3d at 167.
170. Id. at *13, 500 S.W.3d at 169 (Wood, J., concurring).
171. S.J. Res. 8, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017), http://www.ark
leg.state.ar.us/assembly/2017/2017R/Bills/SJR8.pdf.
172. Id.
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disclosure of donors to dark money groups that spend money in judicial races, and prohibit the “earmarking” of appropriations by legislators.173
As the ultimate interpreters of state constitutions, state supreme courts
define the right to trial by jury. All around the country, big business groups
are spending millions of dollars to elect judges who will limit the state constitutional right to a jury trial.174 And in many places, trial lawyers are
spending big to elect judges who will interpret it broadly.175 The scope of
constitutional rights should not depend on the outcome of elections—
legislative or judicial.
B.

“Tough on Crime” Ads Create Pressure in Criminal Cases

Criminal defense attorney Tim Cullen ran for a seat on the Arkansas
Supreme Court in 2014, and he faced a vicious attack ad from a dark money
group based in Washington, D.C.176 The ad featured an eerie black-andwhite image of an empty playground, and it claimed that Cullen had called
child pornography a “victimless crime.”177 Other states have seen similar
attack ads, and they often tie a judge or candidate to child sexual abuse. 178
Recent studies suggest that as trial lawyers and big business fight political
battles over state supreme courts, criminal defendants can get caught in the
crossfire.179
A 2013 study from the Center for American Progress (CAP) examined
rulings in criminal cases by seven supreme courts that had recently experienced their first election in which more than $3 million was spent.180 The
study examined rulings in criminal cases within five years before and after
each court’s first $3 million election.181 In three of these states, the courts’
173. Andrew DeMillo, Analysis: “Tort Reform” Measure May Face Ballot Competition,
WASH. TIMES (June 10, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/10/analysistort-reform-measure-may-face-ballot-compe/.
174. See Billy Corriher, Big Business Is Still Dominating State Supreme Courts, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2016), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/
01095715/BigBusinessStateSupremeCourts-report.pdf.
175. Id. at 15.
176. Buying Time 2014 – Arkansas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 13, 2014),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time-2014-arkansas.
177. STSUPCT_AR_LEAA_YOUNG_VICTIMS,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Buying_Time/STSUPCT_AR_
LEAA_YOUNG_VICTIMS.PDF (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
178. KATE BERRY, HOW JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IMPACT CRIMINAL CASES 3–5 (2015).
179. Id. at 7–9 (summarizing studies on how attack ads can impact rulings in criminal
cases).
180. See Billy Corriher, Criminals and Campaign Cash, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct.
2013), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CampaignCriminalCas
h-6.pdf.
181. Id.
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percentage of rulings against criminal defendants peaked during the bigmoney election years, even though these elections resulted in no change in
the membership of the courts.182
The CAP study found that the Illinois Supreme Court’s percentage of
rulings against defendants jumped 18 percent in 2004, as millions of dollars’
worth of ads flooded the state.183 One television ad featured actors portraying criminals describing their grisly crimes, chuckling about them, and stating that one of the supreme court candidates had set them free.184 The percentage of rulings against defendants dropped in 2005.185 The court saw a
similar peak during the 2000 election.186 In 2006, the high courts in Washington and Georgia saw their first multimillion-dollar elections, and the
study found a similar, though smaller, peak in rulings against defendants.187
Some of the other courts in the study experienced a change in membership,
and the peaks came after more conservative justices joined the courts.188
Studies from Professor Joanna Shepherd and others have found similar
trends in states with big-money supreme court elections.189 A 2014 study by
Shepherd and Kang examined rulings in criminal cases from 32 states from
2008 to 2013.190 The study found a correlation between the number of ads in
judicial elections and rulings against criminal defendants.191 It also found
that,
Justices in states whose bans on corporate and union spending on elections were struck down by Citizens United were less likely to vote in favor of criminal defendants than they were before the decision . . . . In
these states, the removal of those prohibitions after Citizens United is associated with, on average, a 7 percent decrease in justices’ voting in favor of criminal defendants. 192

There is no evidence that such trends are occurring in Arkansas, but
that could change as attack ads become more common. The court has recently found itself at the center of a controversy surrounding the death penalty.
In April 2017, the state planned to carry out eight executions over two
182. Id. at 1.
183. Id. at 12.
184. Id. at 13.
185. Id. at 12.
186. Corriher, supra note 180, at 12.
187. Id. at 16–19.
188. Id. at 20–23.
189. See BERRY, supra note 178 (the Brennan Center for Justice in 2015 reviewed several
studies on the relationship between judicial elections or judicial campaign spending and
rulings in criminal cases).
190. See Shepherd & Kang, supra note 6.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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weeks, before its lethal injection drugs expired, but the Arkansas Supreme
Court halted two of the executions.193 When the court’s order came down, a
federal court and Pulaski County Judge Wendell Griffen had effectively
halted the other executions.194 Judge Griffen had ruled in favor of a pharmaceutical manufacturer which claimed that the state had obtained the drugs
for the lethal injections by improper means, and he ordered the state to return the drugs.195
Judge Griffen was admonished and removed from all death penalty
cases by the state supreme court for participating in a death penalty protest
on the same day that he entered the order.196 Some perceived the judge as
playing the part of an inmate in a mock execution.197 Judge Griffen argued
that the state supreme court made its decision without giving him an opportunity to defend his conduct.198 The judge, who is also a pastor, described
the event as “a Good Friday prayer vigil with other members of my church
congregation.”199 As with Judge Piazza, some legislators tried to build support for impeaching Judge Griffen.200
IV. CONCLUSION
The current method of choosing Arkansas Supreme Court justices does
not allow the judicial branch to protect individual rights in the face of political pressure to do otherwise. This system is not fair to Arkansas’ LGBT
citizens, nor to the criminal defendants who could become fodder for “soft
on crime” campaign ads. Like some other elected officials in the state, Ar193. Mark Berman, Arkansas Execution Called off After Supreme Court Denies Challenge, WASH. POST (April 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/
2017/04/17/arkansas-fights-to-carry-out-unprecedented-wave-ofexecutions/?utm_term=.68f1b0ffd645.
194. Id.
195. In re Pulaski Cty. Circuit Court, 2017 Ark. LEXIS 154 at *3 (2017) (Kemp, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at *1.
197. Liliana Segura, Arkansas Justice: Racism, Torture, and a Botched Execution,
INTERCEPT (Nov. 12, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/12/arkansas-death-row-executio
ns-kenneth-williams/.
198. David Koon, Griffen Asks Probe of Ark. Supreme Court and AG’s Office Conduct,
ARK.
TIMES:
ARK.
BLOG
(April
26,
2017,
4:49
PM),
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2017/04/26/griffen-asks-judicial-disci
pline-committee-on-prof-conduct-to-investigate-ark-supreme-court-and-ags-office-conduct.
199. Wendell Griffen, Meaning What We Claim, JUST. IS A VERB (May 3, 2017),
http://wendelllgriffen.blogspot.com/2017/05/meaning-what-we-claim.html.
200. Max Brantley, Trent Garner Tries to Stir Impeachment Movement Against Wendell
Griffen,
ARK.
TIMES:
ARK.
BLOG
(May
1,
2017,
1:33
PM),
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2017/05/01/trent-garner-tries-to-stirimpeachment-movement-against-wendell-griffen.
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kansas Supreme Court justices stood in the way of efforts to desegregate
schools and ensure equality for LGBT couples.
Because the U.S. Constitution is the “Supreme Law of the Land,” federal court rulings in favor of civil rights have ultimately been enforced, even
when state officials resist.201 Justice Johnson and the state supreme court
refused to intervene when state officials tried to delay or thwart the implementation of Brown v. Board of Education, forcing the U.S. Supreme Court
to put an end to the state’s recalcitrance. Arkansas officials have begun offering birth certificates on equal terms to all married parents, though the
state and courts are still deciding how to deal with the language of the discriminatory birth certificate statute.202 In Pavan, the High Court again made
it clear that its marriage equality ruling “can neither be nullified openly and
directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers nor nullified indirectly by them . . . .”203
In between these legal battles over civil rights, there were certainly
counterexamples of the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreting state constitutional rights broadly. The court has protected the right to a jury trial, as discussed above. Though it fought to preserve segregation 50 years ago, the
court has acted to bring about a more equal state education system since
then. A lawsuit by the Lake View School District against the state resulted
in a decades-long legal battle over the adequacy of Arkansas’s education
financing system.204 Despite the state’s attempts to fix education funding in
the 1990s, the school district argued the state was failing to satisfy its constitutional mandate to “maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free
public schools and . . . adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the
advantages and opportunities of education.”205 The Arkansas Supreme Court
agreed in rulings in 2002 and 2004,206 and the legislature is still working
towards satisfying its constitutional mandate to provide an adequate education to all of Arkansas’s children.207

201. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
202. John Lynch, Judge: Arkansas Birth-Certificate System Will Be Shut Down if not
Fixed by Jan. 5, ARK.ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2017), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/
nov/28/judge-fix-birth-recording-by-jan-5-2017-1/.
203. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 17 (1958).
204. Ark. Dep’t. of Educ., Chronology of Milestones in Lake View, ARKANSAS.GOV (May
23, 2012), http://www.arkansased.gov/public/userfiles/Legal/Milestones_in_Lake_View_
Case_-_BLR.pdf.
205. ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1.
206. Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002);
Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 385 Ark. 137, 189 S.W.3d 1 (2004).
207. Sara Whites-Koditschek, Statehouse Standoff over Education Fund a Matter of
‘Adequacy,’ KUAR (Nov. 1, 2016), http://ualrpublicradio.org/post/statehouse-standoff-overeducation-funding-matter-adequacy#stream/0.
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Despite fairly recent rulings that could be described as progressive,
special interests that want more conservative, pro-business justices are beginning to dominate spending in Arkansas Supreme Court races.208 These
special interests want a court that will uphold tort reform laws, even if they
eviscerate the right to jury trial. To get this court, they have resorted to attack ads that pressure judges to rule against criminal defendants. Elections
for the Arkansas Supreme Court have certainly become more expensive and
rancorous in recent years.209 The increased politicization may have contributed to the recent anti-LGBT rights rulings, and one non-ruling.210 More
spending means more attack ads, and presumably, a stronger desire to avoid
controversial rulings.
An Arkansas Bar task force recommended a system in which a commission composes a list of three candidates from which the governor chooses a nominee, subject to Senate confirmation.211 The state bar’s proposal
includes a single, 14-year term, similar to a proposal from the Wisconsin
bar.212 An American Bar Association commission in 2003 adopted the position that judges, elected or appointed, should serve a single term of at least
15 years.213 Arkansas already has term limits for its state legislators, and
voters in 2014 lengthened that limit to 16 years.214
Such a system would ensure that justices, once on the bench, never
have to worry about being reelected or reappointed. This would give them
the independence needed to protect individual rights in the face of political
pressure. Former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus said that facing reelection is like having a “crocodile in your bathtub” that you can try to
ignore.215 “You cannot forget the fact that you have a crocodile in your bathtub . . . . You keep wondering whether you’re letting yourself be influenced,
and you do not know. You do not know yourself that well,” he said.216 As an
208. See ALICIA BANNON, CATHLEEN LISK, & PETER HARDIN, WHO PAYS FOR JUDICIAL
RACES?, (2017); Eric Hananoki, Why Media Outlets Shouldn’t Take The Judicial Crisis Network Seriously, MEDIA MATTERS (February 19, 2016), https://www.mediamatters.org/
research/2016/02/19/why-media-outlets-shouldnt-take-the-judicial-cr/208705.
209. See Hananoki, supra note 208.
210. See supra Section II.B.
211. See TASK FORCE, supra note 31.
212. See STATE BAR OF WIS., JUDICIAL TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT (2013),
http://host.madison.com/judicial-task-force-preliminary-report/pdf_82938438-47fb-50f08a8a-83fe808ebba4.html.
213. AM. BAR ASSOC., COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY: PRINCIPLES AND
CONCLUSIONS (2003).
214. J.B. Wogan, Arkansas Voters Approve Extended Term Limits, GOVERNING (Nov. 5,
2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-arkansas-voters-term-limits-ballot.ht
ml.
215. Maura Dolan, Otto Kaus Dies; Former Justice on State High Court, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
13, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-01-13/local/me-24215_1_state-high-court.
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example, Justice Kaus cited his ruling to uphold a controversial ballot initiative just weeks before his 1982 reelection.217 Alicia Bannon of the Brennan
Center for Justice recently noted:
Importantly, some of the strongest empirical evidence on how selection
impacts judicial independence suggests that reselection pressures —
whether through elections or appointments — pose severe challenges to
fair courts. Yet, this is an area where the safeguards are almost uniformly
weak. Only three states— Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island—have life tenure (with or without a mandatory retirement age) for
judges.218

Alexander Hamilton referred to life tenure for federal judges as an “excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative
body.”219 His Federalist No. 78 argues that judicial independence is needed
to guard constitutional rights from “the effects of those ill humors, which the
arts of designing men . . . sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which . . . have a tendency . . . to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minority party in the
community.”220 He makes clear that life tenure allows judges to serve as a
counter-majoritarian check but notes that “it would require an uncommon
portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the
Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the
major voice of the community.”221
The framers of the U.S. Constitution understood the need for judicial
independence. In Arkansas, the system of electing judges has not afforded
judges the independence needed to protect individual rights. The Arkansas
bar’s proposal would grant judges much more freedom to rule as the law
requires, regardless of the political consequences. Our constitutional values
of justice and equality should never be put to a vote.
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